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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
RICHARD W. MILLER
Plaintiff-Respondent,
SHERYL RAE (MILLER)
I Case No.
13629
MARTICORENA
Defendant,{
and
SERGIO A. MARTICORENA
Third-Party Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF T H E CASE
This is an appeal by the Third Party Defendant,
Appellant Marticorena from a Decree and Order by
the Family Courts Division of the Third District Court
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, in which
the Plaintiff, Respondent RICHARD W. MILLER,
was declared to be the natural father of the minor child,
MICHAEL WAYNE MILLER, and awarding said
child to the sole care, custody and control of the Plaintiff, Respondent RICHARD W. MILLER.
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D I S P O S I T I O N IN T H E T R I A L COURT
On February 6, 1974, the Third Party Defendant,
Sergio Marticorena appeared before the Family Courts
Division of the Third Judicial District Court, in and
for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Peter F . Leary,
presiding, pursuant to the Plaintiff's Motion and Order
to Show Cause (R. 11, 14), to then and there show
cause why the child, M I C H A E L W A Y N E M I L L E R , should not be surrendered to the Plaintiff, why
the sole care, custody and control of said child should
not be permanently awarded to the Plaintiff, and why
the Decree of Divorce granted to the Plaintiff and the
deceased Defendant, Sheryl Rae Miller, should not be
modified accordingly (R. 9).
After a hearing in which several witnesses were
heard, and additional evidence and testimony proffered
by both Parties, the Court ruled that the Plaintiff,
R I C H A R D W . M I L L E R , was the natural father of
the said child and that he should be awarded the sole
care, custody and control of the said child and that the
said Decree of Divorce should be appropriately modified.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Appellant Marticorena seeks a reversal of the
Decree and Order entered below and Respondent asks
that the Decree of the Trial Court be affirmed.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.
ARD
Sheryl
Utah.

On the 10th of May, 1969, the Plaintiff, R I C H W. M I L L E R , and the deceased Defendant,
Rae Miller, were married to each other in Provo,
(Tr.30).

2. Shortly thereafter the Respondent, M I L L E R ,
left for Fort Gordon, Georgia, to begin his active duty
with the army reserve which was to begin on the 22nd
of May, 1969. ( T r . 3 0 ) .
3. Shortly after the Respondent M I L L E R , began his active duty with the army he ceased to receive
any type of communication from his wife. H e then
inquired as to her whereabouts with several of her relatives and was unable to learn of her whereabouts. (Tr.
33).
4. The Respondent then decided to apply for emergency leave, which was granted, and went to California
in the belief that she may have gone to the Los Angeles
area. (Tr. 33).
5. Upon his arrival in California the Respondent
contracted his wife's father who knew where she was
living in the Los Angeles area and the Respondent then
immediately went and contacted his wife. (Tr. 33).
6. In the meantime, while the Respondent's wife
had been in California, she had been seeing the Appellant off and on for a few weeks until the Respondent
found her in August of 1969. (Tr. 11).
7. When the Respondent finally located his wife
3
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in the third week of August, 1969, he co-habitated with
her for three (3) days and two (2) nights (Tr. 32) and
during which time Respondent and his wife had sexual
relations with each other. (Tr. 42), and during which
time the minor child was conceived. (R. 56).
8. Also, at the time the Respondent located his
wife, the initial contact being at Appellant's place of
work, the Appellant Marticorena and Sheryl Rae Miller
stated emphatically to the Respondent M I L L E R that
they had not been living together and that they had at
no time had an affair or sexual relations with each other.
Such admissions were also made on subsequent occasions.
9. Respondent then returned to Fort Gordon,
Georgia, to resume his active duty (Tr. 33) and his
wife, Sheryl Rae Miller, returned to Salt Lake City
approximately two (2) weeks after his departure and
resumed living with her husband, the Respondent, on
approximately October 17, 1969. (Tr. 32, 33, 34).
10. Shortly after her return to Salt Lake City,
Sheryl Rae Miller believing she may be pregnant consulted Dr. Donald M. Kirk, on September 22, 1969,
who confirmed that she was in fact pregnant, and that
she had conceived approximately in the third (3rd) week
of August. The child was then later born on schedule in
Salt Lake City, in wedlock, to R I C H A R D and Sheryl
Rae Miller, on May 26, 1970. (Tr. 44). Further, at
the time of birth Sheryl Rae Miller instructed that a
birth certificate be filled out listing R I C H A R D M I L L E R as the father.
4
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11. The Respondent and his wife then continued
to live together as man and wife for approximately six
(6) months whereupon the couple separated and the
Respondent filed for divorce. (Tr. 38) •
12. The deceased mother, Sheryl Rae Miller, on
numerous occasions both prior to and after her separation with Mr. Miller indicated to him and numerous
others that the child was Mr. Miller's and she further
indicated that if anything should happen to her, she
would like Mr. Miller to have custody of the child.
13. On December 31, 1970, the Respondent, MR.
M I L L E R , filed his Complaint for Divorce (R.l) in
the Third District Court; and the Defendant, Sheryl
Rae Miller, signed an Entry of Appearance and Waiver
on the 31st day of December, 1970 (R.5), and allowed
a Default to be entered against her.
14. The Decree of Divorce between the two parties
was enterd on March 29, 1972 (R. 9, 10) and became
final on June 30, 1972.
15. In the interim the Appellant and Sheryl Rae
Miller had resumed living with each other and were
subsequently married on July 30, 1972, in Salt Lake
City, Utah (Tr. 6).
16. During all of this time, since the birth of the
child and up to and including the present, Mr. M I L L E R continued to carry on as much of a father-child
relationship with the child as circumstances permitted.
The child was taught by the mother that MR. M I L L E R was his father and he (the child) referred con5
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tinually to MR. M I L L E R as his father, despite the
fact that the mother had married the Appellant.
17. After the marriage of the Appellant and
Sheryl Rae Miller in July of 1972, they lived together
for approximately three (3) months, whereupon she
moved to Provo, Utah, taking the child with her and
leaving the Appellant in California.
18. Upon her arrival in Provo she took up residence
with her parents and lived with them until the Spring
of 1973.
19. During this time she was employed with the
Utah State Employment Office in Salt Lake City,
Utah, and with her income from this employment plus
support from MR. M I L L E R , she was able to provide
for the child's support. A t no time during this period
did the Appellant provide any support for his wife,
Sheryl Rae Miller, and for the child.
20. In the early spring of 1973, Sheryl Rae Miller
quit her job and moved back to California, with the
child, to live with Marticorena, and did so for approximately two (2) months.
21. At approximately the end of May, 1973, Sheryl
Rae Miller then returned to Salt Lake City, Utah, with
the child, again leaving Marticorena in California, and
lived with her sister, Karen Wood, for a brief period
of time and then moved into an apartment located at
approximately Thirteenth East and Seventy-two Hundred South in Salt Lake City.
b
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the first of September, 197:*, that h< Appellant moved from California to Salt Lake City, and
resumed his relationship with Sheryl R a e Miller and
the child. This relationship lasted for approximately a
month and one-half when it was terminated by the
death of Sheryl Rae AFder. m an automobile accident
near Winnemueca, Nevada,
-?•'*. Again, during im** intm- \n • «d MR. ^
F K R was spending a great deal of tiim with th< chdd
when he v\ a > in U t a h and provided substantia] amounts
f"i- his support. T h " Appellant provided litth
fi.
s u p p o r t for either h,>, u if or the ehild

I. During the periods when the child was in Cali-•->,;, MR M I ! L E R maintained constant contact
• • * h: »• * •
M:M- snd telephone.
-'>. On October "20. 107'}. Ilu Respondent joined
Maiticorena as a Third Party Defendant, and served
upon him an Order to Show Cause win the child should
• »< I he delivered to M R . M I L L K R , why the sole care,
custody and control of the child should not be permanently awarded t< > M R . M i l J -Kl< and \\\\\ the D e cree of Divorce should not be modified accordingly (R,
26. Subsequently, =. ihe 31st d,
<f October,
1978, the Respondent's Motion and i >n|< •• to Show
Cause came on for hearing before the Family Courts
Division of the Third Judicial District, the Honorable
James S. Sawaya, presiding, Roth PnrhVs wer«- »vj)ct-
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sented by counsel, however, the Court took no testimony and heard no evidence, but ordered both Parties
and the child to submit to a blood test and further ordered that the temporary custody of the child should
be awarded to the maternal grandparents who reside
in Provo, Utah (R. 16,17,19).
27. Dr. Stanley Gibbon conducted the tests and
reviewed the results and on November 13, 1973, advised counsel for both Parties that neither M I L L E R
nor Marticorena could be excluded as the natural father
of Michael Wayne Miller.
28. On February 6, 1974, the Plaintiff-Respondent's Motion and Order to Show Cause came on again
for hearing before the Family Courts Division, the
Honorable Peter F . Leary, presiding, and both Parties
were duly represented by counsel.
29. After a hearing in which several witnesses testified, evidence on the blood tests submitted and admitted, and proffers of proof concerning the testimony
of other witnesses being made, the Court granted the
sole care, custody and control of Michael Wayne Miller
to his father, R I C H A R D W . M I L L E R .

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL
CLUDED ALL

COURT P R O P E R L Y E X NON-ADMISSIBLE
EVI8
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PTCTCCE A N D P R O P E R L Y A D M I T T E D
ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE.

ALL

A s to Appellant's Point I I and all subsections
thereunder, the Respondent submits the following argu(
The Trial Court did not err in xrluding testi—1\y by D r . Donald M . Kirk, M . D . , \\\\h -vspni hi
u v date of the mother's conception and pregnancy.
A careful reading of the trial transcript will show
tiiat Mr. Aadnesen, counsel for the Appellant at the
f:
'T>'\ did not attempt to introduce D r . Kirk's testimony
to show dates of eonerption and delivery, but rather to
show that Sheryl Kae Miller had made certain statements to him that Ma?ticorcini was the father (Tr. 43,
44).
• '
The (lairs relied upon In counsel in Appellant's
Brief pom I up additional shortcomings in Appellant's
position. For example. Sheryl R a e Miller made no
statements to Dr. Kirk on either August 16th, or Sepber 2, of 11)09, because she did not return to Salt
\ e City, for approximately two (2) weeks after Mr.
. . . _ J . K H left lo r-fu M ti the a r m } , a «. her first
doctor appointment \va* not until September 22, 1969.
Appellants Brief also states that Mr. Marticorena
testified thai N!H informed him several weeks before
M R M I L L E R arrived in California thai she was
pregnant. I n view of the facts that the child was delivered on time, as is admitted in Appellant's Brief,
and, as is well-known. th= m e n t i o n prrirwj I\H a human
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fetus is approximately 280 days, this makes Appellant's statement false and impossible.
Further, Respondent arrived approximately the
third (3rd) week in August, in the early part of the
week (approximately Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday - 18, 19 and 20 of August). Substracting 280 days
from the birth of the child on May 26, 1970, puts the
date of conception at about the 18th or the 19th.
All of these misconceptions and misrepresentations
of dates by the Appellant only seem to indicate that he
either was completely lacking in any knowledge of the
true facts, or that he intentionally mislead the Court.
As to Appellant's additional arguments for allowing in Dr. Kirk's testimony the following arguments
are made:
(1) Hearsay:
(a) As to Appellant's Point 1 (a), it is evident
from the transcript that the proffer of proof was
not made to indicate dates but was made to provide evidence as to statments made by the deceased mother to Dr. Kirk. Therefore, the argument in Appellant's point is erroneous.
(b) Appellant argues that statements by the
mother to Dr. Kirk should be admitted under
exception 24 to Rule 63 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence. This Rule provides as follows:
"A statement concerning the birth, marriage,
divorce, death, legitimacy, race-ancestry, relationship by blood or marriage or other similar
fact of the family history of a person other than
10
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the declarant if the judge (a) finds that the declarant was related to the other by blood or marriage or finds that he was so otherwise intimately associated with the other's family as to be
likely to have accurate information concerning
the matter declared, and made the statement as
upon information received from the other or
from a person related by blood or marriage to
the other, or upon a repute in the other's family,
and (b) finds that the declarant is unavailable
as a witness." Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 63
(24).
The rationale for this exception, as for all other
exceptions to the hearsay rule, is that there is a necessity and a basis for reliability.
Morgan noted that: "In the light of the . . .
dangers to which the reception of hearsay exposes the adversary on the one hand, and the obstruction to adequate, intelligent investigation
caused by the exclusion of hearsay on the other,
it is submitted that the test of admissibility
should be (a) whether the hearsay is such that
the trier can put a reasonably accurate value
upon it as evidence of the matter it is offered
to prove, and (b) whether direct testimony of
the declarant is unavailable, or if available, is
likelv to be less reliable." Morgan, Handbook,

p. 2i9.
In addition, Wigmore in his treatise on Evidence observed that in every hearsay exception the following two
elements exists: (a) necessity and, (b) something in the
statement or the circumstances of the utterance which
would serve to guarantee its trustworthiness. Wigmore
11
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on Evidence, 3rd Ed. Vol. 5 Sec. 1421-1422, pp. 204205. See also Olesen v. Henningsen, (Iowa) 77 NW2d
40. If the Court finds the trustworthiness of the declarants' statement to be lacking in credibility it may exclude
a witness' testimony on that basis, or, it may allow the
testimony to be admitted giving it little or no weight
because of the lack of trustworthiness in the original
declarant's statement.
"It is not that they have, each and all, a knowledge by personal observation, but that they at
least know the fact as accepted by family understanding and tradition, and that this understanding, based as it was originally on observation, is
"prima facie" trustworthy." Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. 5 Sec. 1486 (a) (3rd E d . ) .
It is evident from this testimonial qualification that
supposed or alleged statements made to a physician
who has had no prior contact or acquaintance with the
deceased mother are inadmissible because of an obvious
lack of sufficient knowledge of the family and mother,
and of the circumstances involved.
In Re Lewis Estate, 121 Utah 385, 242 P.2d, 565
(1952) subscribes to this same testimonial qualification. Although the Court therein did permit evidence
from witnesses who were non-relatives, the Court did
indicate that the relationship between the original declarant and non-relative must be so intimate that the
witness' interest" . . . would lead them to know the
truth and that they would not be likely to be mistaken."
Ibid., at 567.
12
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The trustworthiness of the supposed original statement made by the mother is also highly questionable.
The Court in re Lewis Estate, supra, again stated, at
page 567, that "such declarations are received in evidence as being the natural effusions of a party who
must know the truth, and who speaks on an occasion
when his mind stands in an even position, without any
temptation to exceed or fall short of the truth."
How then can a woman who may have been emotionally agitated and greatly concerned over the paternity of the child and the implications this could have on
herself, her marriage and the expected child be considered as a person whose mine "stands in an even
position"? Further, under such circumstances there
may have been great temptations to lie to the doctor.
In addition, how can a woman whose sexual activities, which could be characterized as little else than
promiscuous, as evidenced by a constant and continuous change in sex partners, really know who the father
was. Both parties testified that they had sexual relations with the decedent at or near the time of conception (Tr. 12, 42), although it has been previously
pointed out above that MR . M I L L E R was the only
one who had access to her at the time of conception.
As has been stated, the original declarant must have
reliable information. One final authority which supports this position is as follows:
"In the event it appears that the evidence offered
does not emanate from such a source, the presumption of the reliability of the source of in-

13
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formation is rebutted and evidence becomes inadmissable" 20 Am. Jur. Sec. 468, p. 410. See
ash Re Hurlburt, 68 Vt. 366, 35 A. 77.
I t is therefore evident that the original declarant's
knowledge was, at best, unreliable, and that Dr. Kirk
was not sufficiently involved with the declarant in
order to be considered a proper witness.
2. Inconsistency with Prior Divorce Decree:
Appellant's Brief argues that Dr. Kirk's testimony
should not have been excluded because no dates of
birth were mentioned in the Decree of Divorce and
therefore Dr. Kirk's testimony would not be inconsistent with such Decree. This, again, is erroneous.
Appellant was seeking to introduce evidence of the
deceased mother's statements on paternity rather than
a few dates as to conception and birth as has already
been pointed out. The doctor's statements would therefore have been inconsistent with the Divorce Decree.
Respondent cites Almeida v. Corren, 465 P.2d 564
(1970) as support for his contention that a prior decree of divorce cannot be used in a subsequent paternity
action. In that action the Plaintiff was married and
subsequently gave birth to a child. The child was conceived during her marriage to the first husband but
born between the dates of her Interlocutory and Final
Decree of Divorce from her first husband.
She subsequently brought a paternity suit against
a Third Party who she claimed had had sexual relations and caused her to become pregnant while mar-

14
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ried to her first husband. At this paternity hearing the
Plaintiff introduced, over Defendant's objections, the
prior Decree of Divorce between herself and her first
husband. She introduced the Decree to show that since
the Decree exempted the first husband from paying
any support for the child, that this was proof that the
child was not his and therefore was the child of a Third
Party and the Plaintiff. In ruling on that matter, the
Supreme Court of Hawaii reversed the lower Court
stating that "a determination of the husband's nonpaternity in the divorce proceedings was certainly not
binding upon the Defendant. . . ." Almeida v. Correa,
supra, 571.
It is obvious from the facts of the Almeida case
that it is not at all in point with the facts of the instant
action. In the Almeida case there seems to be an attempt by the Plaintiff to draw the inference from the
release of responsibility to pay support by the first husband, that he was not the father.
In the instant action the divorce complaint alleged
(R. 1), and the Findings of Fact (R. 7), and the Decree of Divorce (R.9) all found that M I C H A E L
W A Y N E M I L L E R was the natural child of R I C H A R D W . M I L L E R and Sheryl Rae Miller. These
are direct and definite findings, not tenuous inferences
from other findings. Further, in the original divorce
proceedings in the instant action Sheryl Rae Miller was
a party to the suit (R.l) and was no stranger to the
action.
15
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In addition, it is very important to note that Sheryl
Rae Miller signed an Entry of Appearance and Waiver
(R. 5) acknowledging that she had received a copy of
the Complaint and Summons and thereby consenting
that Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a
Decree of Divorce could be entered on a Default basis.
What this consistutes is an adoptive admission.
Rule 63(8) Utah Rules of Evidene provides that such
admissions are admissible when the statements are made
by a party of which the other party ". . . with knowledge of the content thereof has, by words or other conduct, manifested his adoption or his belief in its truth."
The signing of the Appearance and Waiver by Sheryl
Rae Miller with full knowledge of the allegations involved in the Complaint constituted an admission of
the statements therein. And all of the elements of an
admission are present.
Sheryl Rae Miller had knowledge of and understood the allegations. She was physically able to deny
them. And she had the opportunity and motive to
deny the allegations. (See 249 Cal. App. 2d 1006) The
motive to deny, although the most difficult element to
prove in most instances, is quite evident in this instance.
The facts show that Sheryl Rae Miller had returned
to California and was living there with the Appellant
when she signed the Appearance and Waiver. Why
would a woman who is living with a man to whom she
has allegedly declared that her son is his (Marticornea's) and then turn around and virtually in his
presence acknowledge the allegations in a Complaint
16
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which state that the child is another man's. There is no
logic to such a situation, and therefore, Sheryl Rae
Miller had the motive to deny in order to maintain
harmony and stability in her relationship with the Appellant and did not so deny.
(3) S E L F - S E R V I N G S T A T E M E N T .
Appellant argues that the Court erred in sustaining the objection to Dr. Kirk's testimony on the grounds
that it is self-serving. The problem involved with such
testimony is that there is no way to guard against fabrication. Sheryl Rae Miller is no longer available for
cross-examination and it is inequitable to bind the Respondent with statements allegedly made to a witness
which the opposing party seeks to benefit by. This is
so because they are hearsay, said statement being used
to prove the truth of the matter in the statement. In
Wilcox v. Salomone, 258 P.2d 845 & 850 (Cal. App.
1953) the Third District Court of California stated that
such statements
". . . would be self-serving declarations, and
hearsay. They would be self-serving since they
were in support of the interest of respondent. . . .
****Declarations of a person, deceased or a party
to the action, made in the absence of the opposite
party sought to be bound by them, which declarations are in support of the party's or declarant's
own interest, are not admissible in favor of those
who claim rights which the declaration would
maintain/'
It is evident from the facts that Sheryl Rae Miller
made self-serving statements to many individuals as to
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the paternity of the child, stating that either Miller
or Marticorena were the father with the primary basis
of the statements depending solely upon her interest
at the time the statement was made, i.e., whose side of
the family she was talking to, benefits to her, animosity
she may have felt towards a particular individual, etc.
Appellant further argues that the statement to
Dr. Kirk should be admitted on the ground that it is
a declaration against interest. One of the pre-requisites
for admissions of such a statement is that the declarant
must have had some particular or special knowledge
which makes the statement reliable and accurate. In
Perkins v. Stephens, 131 Mont. 138, 308 P.2d 620
(1957) the Montana Supreme Court required that the
declarant have ". . . had adequate means of knowledge".
(See also Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 19). As previously stated it is quite possible that Sheryl Rae Miller
did not really know who the real father was because of
the circumstances involved. At best, she was stating an
opinion or estimate which was not reliable, and most
courts refuse to admit statements against interest where
the knowledge or perception is based on a shaky opinion
or estimation. See Smith v. Hansen, 96 P . 1087 (Utah
1908); Salvitti v. Throppe, 343 P . 642, 23 A.2d 445;
G. M. McKelvey Co. v. General Casualty Co., 166
Ohio St. 401, 2 Ohio Ops. 2d 345, 142 S E 2d 854; 73
A L R 433. Courts also require that there be no motive
to falsify. See Smith v. Hanson, supra. No one knows
what may have been the motive of Sheryl Rae Miller
in her alleged declaration to the doctor in regards to
paternity, regardless of who she stated the father to be.
18
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This leads us to one further point. For a declaration of this sort to be admitted the statement must be
against the interest of the declarant. (See Smith v.
Hanson, supra.; Utah Rules of Evidence 63(10). I t
is impossible to know what Sheryl Rae Miller's motive
may have been at the time. Revenge against her husband?; an attempt to placate or please her lover?; putting herself in an advantageous position in case of a
divorce ? — there is no way to know.
All of these points raise serious doubts as to
whether or not Sheryl Rae Miller knew who the father
was thus providing a basis for the exclusion of such
evidence under Rules 8, 19 & 22 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence where the Court feels the evidence is unreliable. Rule 19 in particular states in part that "as a
pre-requisite for the testimony of a witness on a relevant or material matter, there must be evidence that
" . . . he has personal knowledge thereof. . . . "
It is further evident from the transcript of record
(Tr. 42-44) that no foundation was laid by counsel for
the proffer of such testimony, which foundation may
have established the reliability of her statements and
knowledge.
Appellant's next argument is that the testimony
should have been admitted under Rule 63 (12 (b), Utah
Rules of Evidence — Statements of Physical or mental
condition of declarant. Appellant is again in error on
this point. Rule 63(12) (b) allows only statements regarding "previous symptoms, pain or physical sensa19
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tion", and does not include an exception which allows
the declarant to testify as to the cause of the problem
" . . . and the circumstances attendant thereon . . . where
it is made so long after his injury occurred as not to
be a part of the res gestae, since it constitutes merely a
narration of a past event." (20 Am. Jur. Sec. 629, p.
531, 532.)
The declaration of the name of the father
was not a necessary part in securing the services and
treatment of the pregnancy, nor was it relevant to declarant's bodily condition. See Utah Rules of Evidence
63 (12) (b). Nor was the declaration at all spontaneous. "When opportunity for formulation of the content of the statement has existed to sufficient extent to
prevent the declaration becoming part of the main
event, the Courts will uniformly reject the statement
as hearsay, regardless of the character of the declaration or the event it seeks to explain or characterize."
20 Am. Jur. Sec. 570, p. 564. Leach v. Oregon Short
Line R. Co. 29 Utah 285, 81 P . 90; Jackson v. Utah
Rapid Transit Co. 290 P . 970 (Utah 1930); State v.
Rasmussen, 68 P.2d 176 (Utah 1937).
2. As to Appellant's argument under P O I N T I I ,
subsection 2, as regards testimony by Marticorena concerning his access to Sheryl Rae Mller, the following
arguments are submitted:
This point is illustrative of the fact, again, that
Appellant and his counsel are misconstruing and ignorant of the facts involved. At the hearng, counsel
for Appellant sought to introduce testimony regarding
the dates he had met the decedent (TR. 11) which was
20
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admitted, and which dates are, as usual, incorrect. H e
also sought to introduce evidence that he had lived with
Sheryl Rae Miller several months before the conception
of the child. The Court below, we contend, correctly
refused to admit such evidence on the basis that it was
irrelevant and too remote to the period of conception.
Appellant was, however, allowed to testify to the fact
that he had had sexual relations with Sheryl Rae Miller
near the time of conception. (TR 12). The cases cited
by Appellant on these points in no way support the
position that testimony concerning access several months
prior to conception is relevant or material.
Appellant again misleads the Court in stating that
Miller was 3,000 miles away at the time of conception.
As previously stated, the facts indicate that Miller was
the only one who had access to Sheryl Rae Miller at
or near the time of conception. The Wright v. Hicks
case cited by Appellant is therefore not in point, and
his entire argument is fallacious.
3. As to Appellant's argument I I (3) concerning
marital privilege and confidential communications the
following arguments are made:
It should be made clear at the beginning that Respondent has nothing to hide on this point. If the testimony had continued Respondent would have testified
that Sheryl Rae Miller assured him on numerous occasions that the child was the Respondent's and that she
had never had any sexual relations with the Appellant.
H e would have further testified that she had made such
21
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representations to many other relatives, friends and acquaintances of Respondent and his deceased wife. The
objecton was made to protect Respondent from questions concerning his private marital affairs. However,
the communications are still privileged for the following
reasons:
It is well established that a communication made
during a marriage is presumed to be confidential, and
the party objecting to the claim of privilege has the
burden of showing that it was not a confidential communication. Blau v. U.S., 340 U.S. 332; California
Evidence Code Sec. 917; Uniform Rules of Evidence
28.5. The Appellant in the hearing below made no attempt to rebut the presumption of confidentiality ( T R
34-36). The only argument made by counsel below in
an effort to get such testimony admitted was his argument that the privilege does not exist where paternity
is involved (TR. 35) which is totally incorrect. See
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 28. Appellant cannot
now on appeal try to overcome the presumption. To
do so would involve new arguments and constitute raising a new issue on appeal. Clegg v. Lee, 516 P.2d 348
(Utah, 1974); Ingram v. Ingram 521 P.2d 254 (Kan.
1974). Further, the counsel for appellant, rather than
present arguments to allow Respondent to testify, actually submitted that the questions were incompetent,
irrelevant and immaterial when an objection was made
on those bases by the counsel for Respondent. (TR. 35)
Appellant further argues that the claim of confidentiality has been defeated by Sheryl Rae Miller's
22
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alleged communications to third parties. When a confidential communication is made the privilege from
testifying belongs to both spouses. Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 28(1); Luick v. Arends, 132 N.W. 353. It is
a logical deduction from this rule that when one spouse
communicates the privileged statement to a third party
without the consent of the other spouse the privilege of
the unwilling spouse is not vitiated nor obviated, and
the only spouse who waives the privilege is the disclosing spouse. Savings Union Bank, etc. Co. v. Crowley,
176 Cal. 543; Cal. Evidence Code Sec. 912 (a). Such
an argument is sound when it is noted that the communication becomes privileged according to the circumstances under which it was made. Wolfe v. United
States, 391 U.S. 7.
The argument is further bolstered by the authority
which supports the position that when a confidential
writing is transferred from one spouse to the other the
privileged character of the writing s not destroyed
when the spouse to whom it is directed turns the writing
over to a third party without the consent of the other
spouse. Wilkerson v. Stak, 91 Ga. 729, 17 S.E. 990;
Scott v. Corn, 94 Ky. 511, 23 S.W. 219; 63 A L R 127.
It is to be further argued that the disclosure of
the communication to a third party who is generally
the recipient of confidential communications does not
alleviate nor vitiate the privilege. Simrin v. Simrin,
233 C.A.2d 90. This would be the case where the communication was made, whether separately or jointly,
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to a marriage counselor, as in Simrin v. Simrin, Supra,
to a physician, clergyman, etc.
The argument concerning inconsistency with a
prior decree of divorce has been discussed supra.
(4) As to Appellant's argument 11(4) concerning the admission of a letter alleged to have been written by Sheryl Rae Miller, the following arguments are
made.
(a) Hearsay: See Respondent's argument concerning Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 63(24); Statements Concerning Family History, supra.
(b) No Foundation: Appellant's argument that
Respondent's objection, based on lack of foundation,
was merely dilatory is absurd and does not merit argument except to say that laying a proper foundation is
an important pre-requisite and failure to do so does not
put the objecting party in the wrong, paricularly when
the objecting party has a right and a duty to see that
adverse evidence is supported with a proper foundation.
(c) Immaterial Incompetent and Irrelevant. It
is the rule in numerous jurisdictions that if a question
is completely objectionable a general objection — that
it is incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial — will
suffice. 157 A L R 598. In this instance the writing
had no proper foundation, it is quite likely that the
letter was merely self-serving and based on inadequate
or fallacious knowledge of Sheryl Rae Miller for the
reasons discussed supra, and therefore, the letter was
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objectionable on numerous grounds and a general objection was proper.
5. As to Appellant's argument I I (5) concerning
evidence of payment of hospital bills, the following
argument is submitted:
This evidence is obviously irrelevant having no
tendency to show the paternity of the child. However,
it may be of interest to the Court that the Respondent
M I L L E R paid the full hospital bill and was making
payments on the doctor bill when Sheryl Rae Miller
left him and went to California to live with the Appellant.
And if, as Appellant contends, an adequate foundation was finally laid by the end of the hearing why
did his counsel fail to put him (Appellant Marticorena)
back on the stand. Respondent cannot be considered
responsible for this failure. Appellant had an opportunity to retake the stand and made no attempt to do
so.
6. As to Appellant's argument under Point 11(6)
the following arguments are submitted:
This argument by Appellant is merely redundant
as far as Miller and Dr. Kirk are concerned. Also, the
same argument previously made by Respondent for
refusing to admit the testimony of Dr. Kir can also
be made for Dr. Kirk's nurse and Bishop Robert C.
Meyer.
However, the following additional points should
be made clear as regards Bishop Meyer. As previously
25
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argued, a witness should not be allowed to testify unless
he or she is so intimately associated with the declarant's
family that the information is reliable. Bishop Meyer
does not stand in this position. The first time he met
Sheryl Rae Miller and allegedly became acquainted
with the facts involved was almost two years after the
child had been born (TR. 48) and after Miller and her
had separated. (TR. 48). Bishop Meyer was not Sheryl
Rae Miller's bishop (TR. 48) and he had never talked
to Miller or counseled them as to their marital problems.
H e was therefore no more intimately involved with the
family history than any other stranger with whom the
matter is discussed for the first time.
It is also evident from the circumstances that Respondent's objection on the grounds that the alleged
statements to Meyer were self-serving (TR. 50) was
well made. It is quite possible that a woman as Sheryl
Rae Miller consulting a new Bishop about marriage to
a new husband may have had strong desires to appease
him and win his approval, to avoid his condemnation
and to placate and win the approval of her future husband.

SUMMARY OF POINT I
Appellant's entire argument under his Point I I
rests on the knowledge and interests of one woman who
it is unlikely had any reliable or actual knowledge as
to who the father was. In fact, Appellant's entire case
rests on the statements made only by Sheryl Rae Miller.
26
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In addition, it is evident from the circumstances occurring at or about the time that she allegedly made the
statements that they were quite possibly made to serve
her own interests. Rule 63 (24) like all other hearsay
exceptions requires a reasonable degree of reliability
in the evidence and Appellant failed to provide this and
he must bear the consequences.
Further, if Appellant is concerned with the volume
of people she made representations to, Respondent was
and is prepared to bring in a large number of witnesses
who will testify to the contrary — and this gets to the
crux of the whole matter — Counsel at the original hearing below was prepared to have several witnesses testify.
As to these witnesses he failed to lay proper foundations,
have them testify, and he made a number of tactical
errors. In any event, the Appellant's counsel below
failed to litigate the matter more fully when it became
evident that Respondent had co-habitated with Sheryl
Rae Miller at the time of conception, and that Respondent had numerous witnesses who were willing to testify
to the contrary of what Appellant's witnesses were attempting to show. These factors, along with the misconception of the whole factual basis of the case have
characterized Appellant's appeal, i.e., there has been
a lack of understanding of what went on below and
what the facts in the controversy actually are.
At the hearing below Appellant had ample opportunity to present his case. Any blame for a lost case
can only result from poor tactics, and trying to rely
completely on inadmissable evidence. What in effect
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happened was that there was a presumption to overcome and Appellant's simply did not so overcome it.

POINT II.
LORD MANSFIELDS'S RULE.
As stated by Appellant the Court below excluded no
evidence on the basis of this rule and this would be
therefore a new issue on appeal, and therefore, improper. However, the following arguments are submitted for the benefit of the court.
The Lord Mansfield Rule as stated in Lopez v.
Lopes, 30 Utah 2d. 393, 518 P.2d 687 (1974) at 689
P.2d is essentially that
". . . the spouses themselves may not give testimony which would tend to illegitimatize the
child."
Lord Mansfield on this rule stated as follows in 1777,
Goodright v. Moss, Cowp. 591:
". . . Though the testimony of parents in their
lifetime or their declarations after their decease
might be admissible in cases where proof of the
marriage was presumptive only, as by cohabitation or general reputation, yet neither their
declarations nor their personal testimony [of
birth before marriage] could be admitted to bastardize their issue, where as in this case the fact
of the marriage was actually proven [by the
registry entry]. All the cases cited are cases rela-
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tive to children born out of wedlock; and the law
of England is clear that the declarations [or testimony on the stand] of a father or mother cannot
be admitted to bastardize the issue born after
marriage. . . . As to the time of the birth, the
father and mother are the most proper witnesses
to prove it. But it is a rule founded in decency,
morality, and policy, that they shall not be permitted to say after marriage that they have no
connection, and therefore that the offspring is
spurious; more especially the mother, who is the
offending party!3 (Emphasis added)
The prohibition above is exactly what Appellant
is attempting to prove, i.e., that the child born after
marriage is illegitimate. Appellant argues that their
interpretation of the rule cannot possibly illegitimatize
the child. This is error. To establish the child as the
legitimate son of Marticorena he must first destroy the
presumed legitimacy of the child born during wedlock
to Miller and Sheryl Rae Miller, thus bastardizing the
child, and then relegitimatize the child by virtue of 7760-14 UC A (1953).
To do this is contrary to the policy set forth in the
Lord Mansfield Rule and as it is adopted in Lopes v.
Lopes, supra. Appellant seeks to introduce statements
by the mother which would not only "tend to illegitimatize" but would allegedly directly and definitely destroy the legitimacy of a child born in wedlock.
Respondent submits that Section 77-60-14 U C A
(1953) only applies where the child is not already presumed to be legitimate and is solely for the purpose of
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establishing legitimacy of a child previously considered
illegitimate. If Appellant's argument on this point were
sustained the effect would be to render empty and nonefficious the Lopes' decision by allowing parents in a
dispute to testify in order to bastardize the child and
then seek to establish paternity in the same or a subsequent paternity suit, and then utilizing 77-60-14 to religitimatize the child.
In addition, since the policy of such a statute as
77-60-14 is to protect the child, the initial illegitimation
of the child in this case would be highly deleterious to
his welfare. One further point, the Court in Lopes v.
Lopes, supra., at 689 stated:
"Of graver moment than the disgrace to themselves, it seems repugnant to one's sense of justice
to allow them to stigmatize the innocent child,
whose welfare and adjustment will be so crucially affected thereby during his whole lifetime."***". The law in its concern for the broader
interests of society, and in its sense of justice in
protecting the interests of the child, has wisely
provided that restraint upon the parents in the
Lord Mansfield Rule, leaving the proof of such
facts where necessary to come from other
sources."

POINT III.

APPELLANT W A S AFFORDED FULL
DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION
UNDER THE LAW.
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As to Appellant's Point I V the following argument is submitted:
This argument by Appellant is another rehash of
his prior arguments and an in depth discussion of every
point made in his argument will not be made. However, the following points should be made in making
it clear that Appellant had a fair and equitable hearing.
Appellant and his counsel at the hearing below
came into Court hoping to win a favorable decision
using ,as the basis of their case, some evidence with
serious questions of admissability and reliability obvious
before they ever entered the Courtroom. Secondly, they
were relying on the belief that Miller was 3,000 miles
away in Georgia at the time the child was conceived.
Thirdly, they were relying on the testimony of one expert witness — Dr. Charles Scott.
The arguments on the inadmissability of Appellant's evidence have already been made. I t should however, be noted that virtually every item of evidence or
testimony offered by Appellant below was hearsay, and
for which counsel for Appellant did not or could not
lay a proper foundation, and therefore establish reliability. This obviously got the Appellant off to a bad start
leaving his whole case on a shaky foundation when the
Court recessed to allow counsel and Judge Leary to
discuss the problems involved with the evidence in the
case which had arisen to that point.
It was in Judge Leary's chambers where a number of important matters came up. First of all, it was
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made clear to Mr. Aadnesen, counsel for Appellant below, that Mr. M I L L E R was not in Georgia at the
time of conception; but had in fact been present and
had co-habitated with his wife, thus demolishing the
"sound" basis for his case. Next, it was made clear
that Respondent had a Dr. Wilmer C. Wiser, present
who, possessing equal qualifications as Dr. Charles
Scott, was going to testify exactly opposite to what the
testimony of Dr. Charles Scott, would have shown, thus
destroying the third important basis of Appellant's
case upon which he was heavily relying.
With this loss of two of the three primary bases
for his case, all that was remaining was the hearsay
evidence. And even if every item had been admitted
Respondent did produce and could have produced additional evidence, which would have refuted or balanced
out Appellants evidence. In such an event Appellant
could not have established his case by a preponderance
of the evidence, let alone establishing his case beyond
a reasonable doubt as is required in Lopes v. Lopes,
supra.
I t is for these reasons that Mr. Aadnesen saw the
futility in continuing to pursue his case to a greater
and fuller extent, and it is for these reasons that the
record may appear to be superficial or scant. If this
was a tactical error, doubtful as that may be, it is not
reversable error and Respondent cannot take the blame.
The Court was left, therefore, with no alternative
other than to award MR. M I L L E R custody because
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Appellant had not disproved that MR. M I L L E R was
the father beyond a reasonable doubt. It is therefore
evident that a full hearing was had on the matter as far
as Appellant's counsel felt it needed to go and Appellant has therefore had his day in Court.

CONCLUSION
At the hearing below Appellant's case rested on
shaky grounds. H e attempted to show that Respondent
M I L L E R was not the father and was unable to carry
the burden of proof.
The primary thrust of Appellant's Brief has been
that certain hearsay evidence should have been admitted under certain exceptions to the hearsay rule.
All of this evidence and virtually the entire case of the
Appellant had as its basis and origin the highly unreliable knowledge and self-serving statements of
Sheryl Rae Miller. The unreliability and self-serving
nature of Sheryl Rae Miller's declarations could not and
was not over-looked by the Court below. Thus, much
of the evidence was inadmissible and the burden of
proof not maintained. The attitude by Appellant that
the Courts have mulcted him of his child is not a reason
for reversing on any equity grounds. A Court of law
is not a tennis match giving the verdict to the winner
of the best two out of three.
Appellant has had 'his day in Court' and was
afforded ample and full opportunity to present his admissible evidence. We believe that justice was done
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by giving custody over to the true natural father, MR.
M I L L E R , and Respondent therefore respectfully
urges the Court to affirm the judgment of the District
Court.
Respectfully submitted,
Brant H . Wall
Gregory B. Wall
< ?

Attorneys for Respondent
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